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Providing for Retirement:
Some Key Issues
Richard Hawke
Introduction
This topic has become one of the most problematic areas
of policy debate around the world.  The onset of a marked
demographic transition, combined with debate about
the role of government and the efficiency of public
provision, has provided both a trigger and a platform
for debate. In New Zealand, retirement income policy
has been a volatile and unresolved issue since the 1970s.
During the 1980s and 1990s there was considerable
debate about the long-term policy settings. Following
the passage of the New Zealand Superannuation Act
(2001) the issue appeared to drop off the political radar.
However, it has been revived more recently as a result
of political and other contributions – such as New
Zealand First’s proposal for a “golden age card” and the
New Zealand Institute’s discussion papers on an
“Ownership Society”. This flow of ideas, combined with
the shifting demographic profile, should ensure that
retirement income will remain a live issue in the minds
of the electorate.
The framework for retirement
income
While the term ‘retirement income’ is commonly used
and there is general acceptance of its meaning, the specifics
are less clear. Retirement income does not exist to increase
national savings or to provide jobs for actuaries, tax lawyers,
accountants, fund managers, or regulators. The purpose
is to help the elderly live in dignity.
Within this objective there are a number of tensions
for the simple reason that there are many influences on
individual behaviour and a number of needs to be met
when designing schemes for retirement income. There
is also a wide and diverse range of stakeholders
(individuals of various ages, government and a group of
agencies), so that any alternative arrangements should
at least be tested against a common set of criteria. In
1999, the Super 2000 Taskforce suggested the following
headings for this purpose:
Policy stability
When making provision for retirement, people only get
one chance and there is no possibility for “learning by
doing”.  Also, the time frame is far longer than for almost
any other decision they will make, and most people are
risk-averse in such situations. Therefore policy stability
is, essentially, the need for policy changes to take place
only after careful deliberation and in a manner which
allows individuals to adjust to any consequences.
No government can provide certainty, but it can attempt
to reduce instability, e.g. from rapid or unanticipated shifts
of policy. But the desire for stability must be carefully
distinguished from a desire to maintain the status quo.  It
would be dangerous to use the status quo as a hurdle that
has to be overcome before change can even be proposed
(let alone implemented). A key difficulty is that policy
stability implies different treatment according to age. In
this area of policy, as in others, risk factors will change
over time and will require constant re-assessment. As
always, innovation and progress require change.
Sustainability
The Periodic Report Group noted in 1997 that any
retirement income scheme must pass the test as to
whether it can be sustained over a long period. If a
scheme is unsatisfactory, in terms of adequacy,
efficiency, equity or fiscal cost, it will come under
pressure for change or replacement. For these reasons,
the Group suggested that any scheme requires
mechanisms to accommodate adjustments without
requiring large, frequent or radical changes. In addition,
this would allow successive governments to incorporate
changes prompted by new research or changes in
economic, demographic or social conditions; changes
V
ol
um
e 
1,
 N
um
be
r 
2 
20
05
19
in conditions, such as demographics, have the potential
to upset a previously sustainable scheme.
Adequacy
Perhaps the core objective of retirement income is
adequacy.  Modern societies demand that people have a
level of income in retirement sufficient to provide for a
basic standard of living. What constitutes an adequate
standard of living is debatable: values, ideals and
attitudes have changed in the past and will continue to
do so.  While New Zealand and Australia have tended
to focus on the need to prevent old age poverty and
provide for a minimum standard of living, European
countries have tended to relate retirement income to
lifetime earnings; hence, ‘adequacy’ can be understood
in a range of ways.
Equity
Equity is a contentious issue; it is a concept implying
relativity, but without any clear basis for actual
measurement.  In the debate on retirement income,
equity is most often judged by inter-temporal effects,
i.e., allocation between generations. But equity also
relates to intra-temporal issues – for example, equity  in
terms of the tax treatment of alternative savings vehicles.
It is also related to fairness in relation to individual
preferences.  A person who chooses to spend more freely
prior to retirement will end up with less income than
one who spends more prudently – which clashes with
some notions of equity.
Efficiency
All retirement income systems are costly. However, it is
desirable for unnecessary costs to be avoided. The
distribution and allocation of costs will also affect
individual behaviour,  and any judgements to be made
under the other headings listed above. One measure of
policy might be the degree to which adequacy and equity
are achieved while minimising total cost. Of course, a
system designed around these criteria alone may not
lead to a sustainable solution.
Why is reform needed?
In common with many other countries, New Zealand is
experiencing a rise in the proportion of older people as a
result of increased life expectancy and lower birth rates.
Analysis of census data suggests that the proportion of the
population aged over 65 will rise from the current 12% to
25% by 2050. But the changes are far more profound
than the simple ageing of individuals. The shift in
demographic structure is associated with an increase in ‘age
dependency’; i.e. the ratio of people of retirement age
relative to those of working-age. Under present
arrangements, annual payments under NZ Superannuation
will rise from current levels of 4% of GDP to around 9%
over the next 50 years.  This trend has the potential to
affect the stability of the whole economy.
The demographic change will also extend further the
length of time people are expecting to be ‘retired’.
In 1900, the average life expectancy for both men
and women was less than the qualifying age for the
old age pension; in 1938, when ‘universal
superannuation’ was introduced for those over 65 the
average life expectancy was 65 for men and 68 for
women. While the qualifying age for National
Superannuation is currently 65 life expectancy has
increased substantially; therefore, the period over
which the government is expected to contribute to
retirees’ income is considerably longer. Over time, as
the New Zealand population ages, the nature of this
population will change (both in terms of age and
ethnicity). At present, the over 65 year age group is
dominated by Europeans while the Maori and Pacific
Island population is generally much younger;
however, over time Maori and Pacific peoples will
form an increasingly significant component of the
older age groups.
In general, it is expected that retired people in New
Zealand will continue to become more diverse in many
ways: marital status, employment history, asset
holdings and educational profile. This diversity must
be accommodated. Recent research reveals both the
lack of financial wealth among New Zealand retirees
and the fact that, relative to other countries, asset
ownership in New Zealand is much more heavily
weighted towards housing. As a result, the retired
population is particularly sensitive to changes in the
rate of New Zealand Superannuation.
All these changes in demographics, population structure,
the labour market and the status of New Zealand’s
retired population provide good reasons to rethink the
way in which New Zealand makes provision for
retirement income. The central question is; precisely
what changes should be introduced?
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What are the options?
Pension reforms initiated around the globe have tended
to have common ingredients: retaining a state-run
distributive pillar in support of the old-age poor; a
complementary pillar of fully-funded savings based on
personal accounts (which may be run by either the
public or private sector); and a pillar of voluntary
private savings. For the majority of reforming
countries, these changes represent a radical departure
in three ways:
1. A more explicit separation out of the redistributive
component of retirement provision;
2. The substitution for a pay-as-you-go arrangement
(PAYG) by a fully-funded arrangement (at least in
part) of old age saving; and
3. The frequent use of private management for the
collection of contributions, the investment of
pension funding savings, and/or the payment of
pension benefits.
Despite the move away from PAYG schemes one of the
goals of public pensions is to reduce poverty among the
elderly and so, even with a fully funded scheme, some
form of public pension scheme is likely to be necessary.
Therefore, the debate over pensions should be concerned
with the relative merits of arrangements implemented
in addition to the state-run distributive pillar.
PAYG schemes:  For an individual, PAYG schemes rely
on an implicit contract: i.e., a contribution now
‘guarantees’ a pension in the future. These schemes are
a direct transfer of the right to consume from younger
to older people and are usually run by the state because
they have the ability to tax current income earners and
use the proceeds to pay current pension demands and
do not need to accumulate funds over time.
These schemes require the output per worker to exceed
the sum of the growth rates in the retired population
and in real pensions, otherwise changes in the
contribution rate, in coverage or in the payout must be
made.  In times of real income growth and with a
population that isn’t ageing, there is an incentive to
provide a PAYG scheme as everyone gains.
Contrary to popular belief, these schemes are not risk-
free: governments can, and historically have, discounted,
defaulted and changed the rules of entitlement and
pension provision. In doing so, they may violate the
previously agreed commitments to provide predictable,
stable, long-lasting and comprehensive coverage. In
addition, they cannot cope with a diversity of time
preference.
Funded schemes: These rely on the investment of
current income into financial assets that are then used
for the provision of a future pension. Thus, these
schemes are a mechanism for accumulating financial
claims, which can be exchanged at a later date. While
there are many variations on funded schemes there are
two main types of funded schemes, ‘defined benefit’ or
‘defined contribution’. They posses the following
distinguishing features:
In defined contribution schemes (DC) the
individual’s pension (or entitlement) is determined
only by the sum of the accumulated financial assets
of the individual and the fund’s earning rate. That
is, the ultimate benefit depends on the individual’s
contributions and planning success so that their
pension benefit is funded in advance.  Historically,
these systems have been highly focussed on the
individual; however, the exact nature of this type
of scheme is becoming more blurred as notional
defined contribution schemes have been enacted
in countries such as Sweden.
In defined benefit schemes (DB) the pension paid
out is determined by the employee’s previous wages
(over some nominal period). Historically, DB
schemes were designed to help solve contracting
problems between workers and firms.  Firms often
want to reduce worker mobility because hiring is
costly or because new workers need firm-specific
training. However, workers do not want to commit
to remaining with one firm. A rising wage profile
and back-weighted pension accruals induce a
worker to stay.  However, the benefits of these
schemes were distributed very unevenly: some
employees did very well while most did not benefit.
Reform options: While the path taken by many countries
follows a template provided  by the World Bank in 1994,
leading to similarities across the world, each country starts
from a different position and has a different set of ideals
and norms.   Many argue that the natural policy response
to population ageing is to find ways to increase self-
provision for retirement, normally in the form of
compulsory savings by employees or their employers.
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New Zealand has not followed this path.  Interestingly
New Zealand adopted it for a brief time in the early
1970s with the contributory scheme of the Labour
Government; however, the election of the 1975 National
Government resulted in this scheme being changed to
universal New Zealand Superannuation (NZS).  Hence,
private provision for retirement relies on voluntary
savings and the New Zealand ‘solution’ to the fiscal
pressures on its publicly provided pension programme
has been the creation of the New Zealand
Superannuation Fund (NZSF).
However, this is not a structural change or an increase
in the private provision of retirement income; rather
it is a mechanism intended to change when the burden
of increased future pension payments occurs. This
‘solution’ does not change the balance between the
roles of the government and the individual; its
objective is to maintain the government’s financial
ability to continue to provide a universal public
pension. In considering the future options a number
of key issues must be addressed.
Key issues
Economic growth
Real income growth is critical for all retirement income
schemes.  PAYG schemes have relied on income growth
to enable current pensions to exceed past contributions;
i.e. the sum of the growth rates in the working population
and labour productivity must exceed the sum of the
growth rates in the retired population and the real
pension.  Similarly, DB schemes rely on the ability of
future generations to fund the retirement of past
generations. DC schemes rely on the individual’s
contributions and success in asset allocation; therefore,
the economic growth rate affects individuals’ views of
future economic conditions and, by extension, their
willingness to forgo current consumption for the benefit
of future consumption.
Uncertainty and risk
One of the major reasons for the New Zealand
Superannuation Act (and the New Zealand
Superannuation Fund) was the desire for certainty.
However, certainty in state provision does not imply
certainty for the individual. The recent AMP
Superannuation survey notes that of all those surveyed,
45% (49% in July 2000) were saving for their retirement;
when told the rates for NZS 76% said that was not enough
money; and 62% said they did not think a similar level of
pension would be available for them on retirement.
Uncertainty and risk are two different core issues that
pension schemes face. With risk, the probability
distribution of potential outcomes can be estimated;
with uncertainty it cannot. Therefore, while insurance
can deal with risk, it cannot deal with uncertainty.  For
pensions there are at least three sources of uncertainty:
1. Macroeconomic changes.  For example, a decline in
real output has adverse effects on pension schemes.
Inflation affects pensions, but tends to affect funded
schemes more e.g. the effect on German private
savings due to hyperinflation in the 1920s;
2. Demographic changes.  Changes such as population
ageing affect all types of schemes; however, changes
in demographics have played the most significant
role in placing the PAYG schemes under pressure to
change; and
3. Political changes. The enforceability of the inter-
generational contract, for example, requires effective
government, while there is no ‘higher court’ to appeal
to if the government of the day changes the nature
of pension provisions.
Pension schemes also face sources of risk:
1. Management risk.  Pension funds can be affected by
fraud and incompetence (e.g. The Maxwell Group
of Companies in the UK)
2. Investment risk.  The choice and behaviour of any
pension plan manager affects the returns to the fund,
and fluctuations in fund value.
One of the reasons for any pension scheme is to
distribute and apportion risk and uncertainty.
New Zealand: can we continue to
be special?
New Zealand is similar to other developed countries in
having a significant public pension scheme.  However,
New Zealand is unique in its complete reliance on
taxation funding and its focus on universal benefits; this
reflects New Zealand’s social and political history.
Despite New Zealanders’ desires for policy stability it is
important to note that since the introduction of NZS
the level of payout has been adjusted a number of times,
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including changes to the indexation regime; a taxation
surcharge has been introduced (and removed); the age
of entitlement has changed; and the system has been
characterised as unsustainable (by the 1988 Royal
Commission on Social Policy).
The comparison with Australia: With the increasing
emphasis on closer economic relations between New
Zealand and Australia, we have seen a closer integration
of the Australian and New Zealand labour markets.
In both countries there has been a move towards more
flexible labour markets for both sexes, and more
transparent remuneration policies. In these
circumstances, New Zealand’s ability to maintain a
separate approach from Australia in relation to
retirement income is questionable.
Until 1986, Australia relied on its Age Pension (a
universal, but means-tested, benefit payment) for
retirement income provision.When a Labour
Government was elected in 1983, a major part of its
economic strategy was a continuing contract with the
union movement.  This set the scene for the introduction
of a compulsory superannuation scheme – this was seen
as a deferred wage and salary arrangement, rather than
as a significant change in social security.
In any country, structural reform of retirement income is
complicated politically and economically. Many of the
expected benefits are long-term, uncertain and will largely
accrue to younger people. Faced with limited resources
and pension costs that have become the largest single
item of public expenditure, most governments will change
some aspect of the pension system (such as increasing
the age of entitlement or changing the indexation regime).
Thus, reform is not a case of weighing the interests of the
young against those of the old but rather a question of
community, and ideally cross-party, consensus. One
mechanism for encouraging this is to use institutional
structures to focus the debate.  In Australia the strong
union and employer groups had a century-long history
of bargaining before the arbitration courts.  This helped
to develop an incomes policy within which a trade-off
between a wage increase now and retirement income later
became workable.
Stocktaking for the future
The extensive liberalisation of the New Zealand economy
in the 1980s and 1990s did not include any overhaul of
the country’s approach to retirement income. We have
seen that the current scheme attempts to cover three major
objectives: relief of poverty, recognition of the aged, and
deferral of income - so that living standards in retirement
can be closer to those enjoyed during working life.
True, NZ Superannuation does offer one measure of
stability, i.e. all New Zealanders, regardless of lifetime
earnings or other variables, such as illness, can be
comfortable in the knowledge that they will have an
income when they retire.  The aim of the scheme is that
this should be at an “adequate” level.  This depends in
turn on an overall societal view on what constitutes an
adequate standard of living.
We see in effect that the appearance of stability is
deceptive; the system results in an inter-generational
transfer which is large and increasingly burdensome for
the working-age cohort. The NZSF was set up to meet
some of these problems, but there are many “ifs and
buts” which suggest that, despite broad political
acceptance, it is in itself not a solution. It is not too
hard to see it failing the test of sustainability. Before
that happens, we should make use of the current good
health of the economy to explore how other elements
could be brought into the overall design.
In a different world...
Over a period of 25 to 30 years, the world has been
changing quite fundamentally for New Zealand and
for New Zealanders. As individuals, we have much
more freedom to travel, see the world and change our
place of employment or residence. The country’s
economy is itself more closely integrated with the world
economy. New Zealanders are increasingly able to
compare our standard of living with what is available
elsewhere (particularly on the other side of the Tasman).
Another significant trend, and one which has been reinforced
by this greater exposure to the outside world, is the move
towards a more diverse society inside New Zealand.   Ageing
of the population is not the only factor which might influence
future policies. Society is also changing; in particular, there
is an ongoing growth in the Maori and Pacific Island
populations. Historically, these groups have had quite
different experiences in terms of the way they provided for
old age.  Home ownership rates have been lower, as has life
expectancy.  The precise composition of population growth
thus becomes more relevant to policy.
Changes in New Zealand society, in family structure
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and in the nature of households has already altered
the type of housing required. Although housing
investment in New Zealand has traditionally been as
‘safe as houses’, past trends may not be a good indicator
of the future.  No longer is population growth driven
by a high birth rate and no longer is the nuclear family
the standard model for home ownership.  A standard
pattern for housing tenure, career, and early family
formation has given way to a wide range of lifestyle
pathways. Therefore, investing income in the housing
market may become less desirable as an avenue of
providing for retirement.
Finally, changes in the profile of a “working life” have
already become substantial.  One feature of PAYG
schemes is that they maintain a link between the ‘age
of entitlement’ and the ‘age of retirement’. Given the
decreasing size of the workforce, increased longevity,
loss of skills and decline in well-being when people
retire, and the desire for many people to work during
at least their early years of retirement, breaking this
link would be valuable. Increasing the age of
entitlement in the 1990s demonstrated how sensitive
the New Zealand labour force participation rates can
be. A move to a more flexible, and individually
focussed, retirement age would be advantageous to
both older workers and employers.
Adding to the choices
Not only does the current New Zealand system of
retirement income provision fail the equity test in terms
of intergenerational equity, but it also fails in terms of
intra-temporal equity. Is it equitable to have a system
which removes incentives to achieve higher earnings
during one’s working career in order to improve one’s
post-retirement standard of living? Intra-temporal equity
is also important for other reasons. For example, people
naturally expect it in the tax treatment applied to
different ways of saving. Currently, owner-occupier
housing in New Zealand is tax-favoured. This leads to
distorted investment patterns, which may also affect the
potential for economic growth.
Given that the PAYG scheme is both inequitable and
potentially unsustainable, something else is obviously
needed to spread the risk to the individual. This could
be designed as another pillar alongside the universal
pension and need not be publicly provided. The DB
arrangement can be quickly discounted: in its time, it
was part of a deliberate strategy to keep workers locked
into employment. This strategy runs counter to current
(and foreseeable) patterns. A scheme based on direct
contributions by individuals is required.
The Australian system is based around individual
accounts, as is the current Canadian system, and the
same mechanism has been promoted as a key element
in the recent United States reforms. Arguably, this type
of account can have two main benefits for a nation’s
economy. First, the accumulation of investments will
add to private and national saving and thus aid the rate
of domestic capital formation (or the accumulation of
the nation’s overseas assets). Second, this structure
provides better incentives for older workers to decide as
individuals how to structure their pattern of
employment. Crucially, this arrangement makes it very
difficult for governments to break commitments
previously entered into.
In order to minimise risk, it would be advisable not to
rely on an implicit contract; however, reliance on one
source of income is also risky.  Instead, the aim should
be to receive income from a range of sources (a
portfolio approach) – and so we return to the three
pillars. The public pension will still provide a floor to
protect against old age poverty.  The mandatory private
savings will establish a link between retirement income
and employment history (as well as various
consumption/lifestyle choices).  It will also reduce the
incentive to free-ride, and will reduce the taxation
advantage of domestic housing. The third pillar,
voluntary savings, would also exist for those who wish
to pursue this option.
It can be seen that the argument for pre-funding through
individual accounts becomes very powerful.  It responds
to the importance of economic growth and the need to
avoid too great a gap between old-age income in this
country and that accessible in other nations, especially
those where New Zealanders can easily migrate during
their working life.  Possibly, the objective of this pillar
should be defined as “providing the mechanism that is
most likely to provide retired people with optimal ability
to consume”; rather than link it to the maintenance of
a minimum standard of living (the first pillar).
Economic and financial changes in the last 20 years have
compelled people to become more discerning about
consumption choices, and this in turn is associated with
the growing importance of self-regulation.
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Conclusion and postscript
To sum up, the current arrangement may be acceptable
to today’s pensioners and may not result in a substantial
decline in income for many New Zealanders in the short
term. In the medium to long term, its defects will
become more obvious – it will not do enough to
promote economic growth, nor will it improve the
ability of future retirees to consume. The economic
future of New Zealand, its households and its individual
citizens is quite different from that experienced since
1970.  It is, therefore, timely to restructure retirement
income provision in New Zealand in order to provide
for the living standards of tomorrow’s retired population.
The creation of a scheme where the eventual payout is
in part a function of previous contributions should
appeal to our notion of equity for the individual. The
accounts would provide a transparent instrument,
similar to that used in many other areas of policy.  They
would represent a shift away from hidden transfers and
unequal treatment for different groups. The creation of
the NZSF was essentially the creation of a mandatory
savings programme and its existence now provides New
Zealand with an opportunity to effect real structural
change.  This change could reflect the increased diversity
of the New Zealand population, together with evolving
patterns of lifetime employment and the need for the
individual to manage risk and responsibility.
It is normal for structural change to occur in times of
extreme budget pressure. The greater challenge for
today’s policymakers is to recognize that the extremely
healthy state of the economy offers the country a singular
opportunity. They may not again enjoy the budgetary
flexibility to seize it.
Postscript: The 2005 Budget was released as this
article was in the final stages of going to press.  In
effect, it provided little for those interested in
retirement savings in New Zealand. The KiwiSaver
scheme attempts to encourage savings for a
number of reasons, one of which is retirement.
However, the policy focus of the scheme is blurred.
First, it is an attempt to encourage “savings” as
such, and second it is facilitating home ownership.
Which goal does it really target?
One has to ask; who will benefit from the scheme
in practice?  Unfortunately, the main beneficiaries
will be those close to retirement. But there is a
small glimmer of hope... an optimist could suggest
that the real benefit of KiwiSaver will be the
indication it provides that the Government has
finally zeroed in on the issue of savings. If so, then
maybe – just maybe - the scheme is testing the
water for some more definitive action in the near
future.  Which brings us back to the need to clarify
the key policy objective.
Richard Hawke carried out extensive
research on this topic at IPS during
his tenure of the Henry Lang
Fellowship from 2003-4 and the
Institute published his detailed study
early this year, under the title
“Retirement Income Provision in New
Zealand: A Way Forward”. This article
draws on the original study and on
more recent contributions to the
debate.   A full bibliography is
contained in the main publication
(pp.147-162). Both IPS and the
author would welcome any comment
on the suggested approach to future
policy on retirement income.
